UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/887
28 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government I have the honour to invite your attention to the following in connection with the contents of Security Council document S/1994/874 of 26 July 1994.

As a target of international terrorism, the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently denounced terrorism in all its forms, including State terrorism. It strongly condemns terrorist acts against innocent people regardless of their nationality or beliefs. In connection with the recent bombing in Argentina, the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Buenos Aires has been in close contact with Argentina's Foreign Ministry officials, and has offered full cooperation and assistance in the investigation. The frantic reactions of various Israeli officials in blaming others, including Iran, without a shred of evidence, before any investigation could even commence are quite suspicious. This may once again be a prelude to a dangerous Zionist adventurism in the region and an escalated State terrorism in terms of air raids, kidnapping and political assassinations. Past experience testifies to the cruelty of Israel targeting and massacring innocent civilians and committing aggression for vengeance.

Quite contrary to the allegations contained in the above-mentioned document, it is in fact the Zionist entity that "considers terrorism an acceptable means to achieve its political ends". It is the Zionist entity that in addition to its regular air strikes against southern Lebanon has continually perpetrated innumerable acts of terrorism in the occupied territories, which have been recorded in volumes of United Nations documents. It is the same entity that has committed countless acts of terrorism in the region, including but not limited to: the transboundary kidnapping of Mustapha al-Dirani from his home in the village of Kasernaba, Lebanon, in May 1994; bombing the Maronite Church at Junieyh Port, Lebanon, in February 1994; the transboundary attack and kidnapping of Sheikh Abdel-Karim Obeid in 1989; the transboundary attack and assassinations of Sheikh Abbas Musawi, his wife, son and six companions in February 1992; and taking hold of and illegally detaining four Iranian nationals, including the Iranian Chargé d'affaires and three companions who had been abducted in Lebanon in 1982.

The renewed dangerous Israeli provocations, its frantic and hurried reactions to recent incidents of bombings and many other similar indications which illustrate the Zionist design aimed at preparing the stage for its future aggression and expanded State terrorism are all too obvious to be ignored by the international community.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/888
27 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 JULY 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I am writing to inform you of the serious difficulties that have arisen for the operations of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia owing to blockades of all UNPROFOR traffic into the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) by demonstrators.

Since 1 July 1994, demonstrators from the Association of Displaced Persons (of Croatia) have deliberately and progressively obstructed all crossing points into the UNPAs. A full list of hindrances at crossing points is attached (annex I).

The blockades have meant that UNPROFOR's ability to monitor the 29 March 1994 Cease-fire Agreement (S/1994/367, annex) has been severely diminished. A direct result of this has been that the number of confirmed serious violations of the Cease-fire Agreement has increased and tensions are rising within the zone of separation. In addition, UNPROFOR personnel have been blocked from performing basic tasks required in the sectors and, as such, they have been unable to conduct negotiations to resolve outstanding issues.

As the majority of UNPROFOR resupply is carried out by road to the sectors, logistic supply has been virtually halted, leading to the use of circuitous and more expensive routes through Hungary and Serbia in order to provide basic supplies for personnel, especially in Sector East. Helicopters have also been used to transport commodities into sectors, as most alternate routes, used from time to time, are now blocked. Furthermore, petrol has been rationed, further restricting the ability of the sector personnel to carry out their functions. Troop-contributing countries have expressed serious concern about the welfare of the personnel they have provided to UNPROFOR.

Movement of personnel for periods of leave and for rotation of units have been seriously hampered; for example, at Camp Pleso there are currently approximately 600 soldiers who are proceeding from leave and cannot return to the UNPAs because of the blockades. Other soldiers in the UNPAs have had their leave cancelled. Perhaps most important is the effect on the morale of the personnel who are being prevented from carrying out their duties.

In response to these obstructions, my Special Representative, Mr. Akashi, met last week with President Tudjman, Prime Minister Valentic, and Mr. Sarinic (President of the State Commission for Relations with UNPROFOR) to impress upon them the seriousness of the situation and the responsibility of the Government of Croatia to ensure that UNPROFOR's work is not impeded. He also conveyed to them that UNPROFOR had clear evidence of the active participation of Croatian police in several of the blockades and that the Croatian Government was in violation of paragraph 8 and annex A of the Cease-fire Agreement of 29 March 1994, which explicitly commits the Croatian Government to opening specific crossing points which are now blocked on the Croatian side.

On 19 July, President Tudjman informed Mr. Akashi that, though the Croatian Government was not officially involved in the blockades, they would only stop when Mr. Akashi publicly announced that all humanitarian aid to the UNPAs would be discontinued and that return of displaced persons to the zone of separation would commence. The first condition is unacceptable and the second unimplementable but, in a spirit of understanding for the frustrations of the displaced persons, Mr. Akashi did release a public statement on 21 July on UNPROFOR's achievements, the obstacles it has faced, and its intentions, particularly as regards the possibility of the return of displaced persons.

Prime Minister Valentic undertook to seek an amelioration of the situation, and the Croatian Government made a public call for an end to the blockades on 21 July. On 23 July, my Special Representative discussed the matter again with President Tudjman. These steps have not yielded positive results, other than the passage in Sector North of one leave convoy on 22 July and a personnel reinforcement convoy on 23 July.

All Croatian Government representatives with whom Mr. Akashi has spoken have pointed to the political sensitivities and difficulties in which they find themselves. There is no doubt that the feelings of the displaced persons in Croatia must be addressed. However, while the democratic right of citizens to demonstrate cannot be denied, it must be balanced against the obligations assumed by the Croatian Government to allow UNPROFOR to do its work. While the Government of Croatia may not be fully in control of the demonstrators, it is undeniably fully responsible for ensuring that their actions do not prevent UNPROFOR from carrying out its mandate.

The present situation cannot be allowed to continue. Without the restoration of UNPROFOR's freedom of movement, the difficult conditions of supply and logistics risk the rapid diminution of the mission's capabilities. If the present situation is not rectified, UNPROFOR will simply be unable to function in pursuance of the mandates entrusted to it by the Security Council.

I recommend that the Security Council take appropriate action to call upon the Government of the Republic of Croatia to fulfil its obligations to UNPROFOR and to end the blockades.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex I

List of restrictions of UNPROFOR's freedom of movement, 1-21 July 1994

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
1	1 July	Sector North Vojnova Crossing	A Polish battalion patrol was not allowed to pass from the Republic of Serb Krajina territory into Croatia.	Croatian Police	Non-verification
2	1 July	Sector North Pavlici (WK 2499)	The route from OP NP 303 (WK 240995) to OP NP 305 (WK 242953) was blocked.	Displaced persons	Harassment
3	1 July	French logistics battalion 1500B Sisak	A convoy was blocked at Sisak and spent four days at Topusko, trying each day to exit the sector. It succeeded at Karlovac on 4 July.	Displaced persons	Disruption of supply convoy
4	2 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
5	2 July	Sector East Highway Croatian checkpoint (Zagreb-Belgrade (XL 467193))	A convoy of United Nations vehicles was stopped.	Croatian Police	Disruption of supply Harassment Loss of freedom of movement

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Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
6	2 July	Sector South	United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) team Zadar was blocked by demonstrators between 1200 hours and 1730 hours. The Zadar-Biograd (WJ 3565) road was closed to United Nations traffic all afternoon. The blockade took place at Biograd (WJ 3565).	Displaced persons	Non-verification
7	2 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
8	2 July	French battalion 3 Turanj	A convoy of 9 vehicles and 25 persons carrying food, water and supplies was blocked and returned to Pleso.	Croatian Police	Disruption of supply
9	3 July	Sector North	UNMO team Turopolje was stopped again at the pontoon bridge at Nebojan (WL 938 386) by a civilian demonstration.	Displaced persons	Non-verification
10	3 July	Sector South	Pakovo Selo (WJ 8854) was blocked by 20 civilians, organized by the Croatian Army between 1015 and 1825 hours.	Displaced persons	Non-verification

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
11	3 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked. At Bair (XL 5862730) the crossing point was manned by Croatian Police.	Displaced persons Croatian Police	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
12	4 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
13	4 July	Sector East Weapon Control Storage Area Nasice (BR 7241)	UNMO team Osijek was denied access to visit the weapon storage area.	Croatian Army	Non-verification
14	4 July	Sector North	UNMO team Turopolje was stopped at the pontoon bridge at Nebojan (WL 938 386) by civilian demonstration.	Displaced persons	Non-verification
15	4 July	Sector North OP NU 22 (WL 979351)	A fuel truck was denied access to the Republic of Serb Krajina side by Croatian Police since 29 June.	Croatian Police	Disruption of resupply

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
16	4 July	Sector North Moscenica Crossing	Three water supply trucks were stopped.	Displaced persons	Disruption of resupply
17	4 July	Sector South T-28 (WK 346593)	A Czech battalion truck with food and water supplies to T-28 was stopped.	Croatian Police	Disruption of supply Harassment
18	4 July	French logistics battalion 0900B Osijek	A food convoy for Sector East was blocked and returned to Pleso.	Displaced persons	Disruption of supply Damage to perishable goods
19	4 July	French logistics battalion 0700B Novska	A convoy with metallic fuel tanks, general supplies, spare parts and duty-free goods was blocked and returned to Pleso.	Displaced persons	Disruption of supply
20	5 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked. At Bair (XL 5862730) the crossing point was manned by Croatian Police.	Displaced persons Croatian Police	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
21	5 July	Sector North	Croatian side blocked Observation Posts Nos. 25, 26, 32, 33 and 34 to supply water and food.	Displaced persons	Disruption of supply Harassment
22	5 July	French battalion 3 Turanj Sisak	A 12-vehicle convoy en route to Pleso was stopped and returned to Velica.	Croatian Police	Disruption of supply

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
23	5 July	French logistics battalion 0800B Karlovac	A food convoy for Sector South was blocked and returned to Pleso.	Displaced persons	Disruption of supply Damage to perishable goods
24	5 July	French logistics battalion 0800B Karlovac	A food convoy for Sector North was blocked and returned to Pleso.	Displaced persons	Disruption of supply Damage to perishable goods
25	6 July	Sector East Weapon Control Sorage Brodanci (CR 125465) and Djakavo (BR 9720)	UNMO team Osijek was denied access to visit the weapon storage site.	Croatian Army	Non-verification
26	6 July	Sector North Danish battalion area of responsibility	Danish battalion was denied use of the ferries out of the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs).	Croatian Police	Loss of freedom of movement Harassment
27	6 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
28	6 July	French battalion 3 Turanj Sisak	Four convoys (food, water and supplies) were blocked at Sisak and Turanj and returned to Velika or Pleso.	Displaced persons	Disruption of supplies

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Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
29	6 July	Sector East 1050B Lipovac	On the Belgrade-Zagreb Highway near Lipovac, the senior military observer was prevented from passing through the crossing point, which was blocked by three displaced persons. Four policemen and 15 soldiers were also present. The policemen refused to talk to the senior military observer. A police car parked near the crossing point was used to bring three more displaced persons and later used to bring lunch for the displaced persons.	Displaced persons and Croatian Police	Restriction on freedom of movement
30	7 July	Sector East Weapon Control Storage Strizivoina (BR 9711)	UNMO team Vinkovici was denied access to the weapon storage site.	Croatian Army	Non-verification
31	7 July	Sector East Weapon Control Storage Zupanja (BR 9711)	UNMO team Otok was denied access to the weapon storage site.	Croatian Army	Non-verification
32	7 July	Sector East Apatin (CR 4260)	UNMO was denied passage.	Croatian Militia	Non-verification Loss of freedom of movement
33	7 July	Sector North	A Danish battalion scout car was stopped at XL 079315.	Croatian Police	Loss of freedom of movement
34	7 July	Sector North	All crossing points were closed to UNPROFOR traffic.	Displaced persons	

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
35	7 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
36	7 July	Hungary	A Belgian battalion mail convoy was rerouted through Hungary.	Displaced persons	Disruption of administration
37	7 July	French battalion 3 Turanj Sisak Otocac	A reconnaissance patrol was sent to Otocac (WK 2068) to test this crossing point. The patrol contacted UNMO to prepare the leave rotation for 11 and 12 July. Two convoys in and one convoy out were blocked.	Displaced persons	Disruption of leave rotation
38	8 July	Sector East	At Bair (XL 586273) the crossing point was closed.	Croatian Police	Disruption of supply
39	8 July	Sector North Gornji Poljana 500 metres from the bridge (WL 938386)	A joint patrol of the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) and Ukraine battalion 2 were stopped.	Croatian Police	Loss of freedom of movement Non-verification
40	8 July	Sector North	UNMO team Turopoljc managed to cross the pontoon bridge at Nebojan (WL 938386) but was denied access to pass through the demonstrators.	Displaced persons	Non-verification

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
41	8 July	French battalion 3 Turanj Sisak Vojvonak Otocac	Two jeeps and two trucks were first blocked at Brinje (WK 1083) by Croatian Police, then tried to cross at Otocac. They tried at Vojnovac and came back to Pleso. One seven-vehicle convoy was blocked at Turanj and Sisak, then tried to cross at Vojvonac and finally came back to Pleso. The cargo consisted of water, spare parts, mail, petrol, oil and lubricants.	Displaced persons	Disruption of supply
42	9 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
43	10 July	French battalion 3	Leave rotation was blocked.	Displaced persons	Disruption of leave rotation
44	10 July	Sector East Donji Miholjac (BR 7971)	One Belgian battalion jeep was denied permission to cross the border with Hungary.	Croatian customs officials	Loss of freedom of movement Harassment
45	10 July	Sector North CP 46 Licko Petrovo Selo Satelit (WK 5869)	A French battalion 3 convoy was denied access to UNPAs.	Croatian Army, Thirteenth Brigade soldiers	Disruption of supply

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
46	10 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
47	10 July	Sector North	UNMO team Turopolje managed to cross the pontoon bridge at Nebojan (WL 938386) but was denied access to pass through the demonstrators.	Displaced persons	Non-verification
48	11 July	French battalion 3 0600B Turanj 1000B Medak 2200B Otocac	One 14-vehicle convoy on leave rotation tried to cross at Turanj, then at Medak and was blocked for five hours by Croatian military police. It joined Otocac at night and spent the night at the Czech battalion location. It succeeded in crossing at 120700B. One 19-vehicle convoy succeeded in crossing at Buzim, then joined Otocac to cross at 1500B and reached Zagreb. The two convoys arrived at Zagreb and all the soldiers were able to go on leave.	Displaced persons	Disruption of leave rotation and mail
49	11 July	Sector South Medak Crossing Otocac Crossing	A French battalion 3 convoy of 15 vehicles and 128 persons was denied passage.	Croatian Police	Disruption of supply Harassment

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
50	11 July	Sector North 2000B Gradusa (XL 199287)	A Danish battalion bus was stopped at Gradusa by five policemen and eight special police by order of the commanding officer of the Sisak police and other UNPROFOR vehicles were not allowed to use ferry. In the area of WL 9338 there are usually four policemen. On 5 July 1994, after a Ukraine battalion 2 car managed to pass through civilian demonstrators, 18 policemen appeared at the site, including the commanding officer of a police unit team with the name "Fakcovic", and another policeman who had Personal No. 08834 (Sisak Police). There were also two police cars (Nos. 100-69 and 100-051). The police blocked the road.	Croatian Police	Loss of freedom of movement
51	11 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
52	12 July	Sector North	UNMO team Turopolje managed to cross the pontoon bridge at Nebojan (WL 938386) but was denied access to pass through the demonstrators.	Displaced persons	Non-verification
53	12 July	Sector North	Team Turopolje was denied permission to cross the pontoon bridge over Kupa river (WL 943402) at 1100 hours by Croatian Army troops.	Croatian Army	Non-verification
54	12 July	French battalion 3 0700B Turanj 0900B Sisak 1230B Vojvonac 1900B Otocac	Two convoys on leave rotation with a cargo of food, petrol, oil, lubricants, water and spare parts tried to cross at Turanj, Sisak, Vojnovac and Otocac, then returned to Pleso.	Displaced persons	Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation
55	13 July	Sector North	The supply line of Polish battalion to observation posts Nos. 307 and 310 was closed.	Croatian Police and displaced persons	Disruption of supply Loss of freedom of movement
56	13 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid

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Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
57	13 July	Sector North	UNMO team Turopolje managed to cross the pontoon bridge at Nebojan (WL 938386) but was denied access to pass through the demonstrators.	Displaced persons	Non-verification
58	13 July	Sector South	UNMO team Gospic was advised by a Croatian Army liaison officer that written permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs was required for convoys using the Medac crossing. No official reason was given.	Croatian Army liaison officer	Harassment
59	13 July	French battalion 3 0700B Turanj Medac	Two convoys on leave rotation with a cargo of food, water, mail, petrol, oil and lubricants tried to cross at Turanj and came back to Pleso. An airlift was scheduled then cancelled. One French logistics battalion convoy succeeded in crossing at Medac and joined Velica with five French battalion 3 vehicles. Twenty French battalion 3 soldiers were transported by helicopter from Pleso to Topusko.	Displaced persons	Disruption of supply Diversion of helicopter assets

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
60	14 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
61	14 July	French battalion 3 0900B Turanj	Three convoys (Zagreb-Velica) were blocked at Turanj. One engineers convoy (Velica-Zagreb) was blocked at Turanj.	Croatian Police	Disruption of troop rotation
62	15 July	French battalion 3 0800B Turanj	Three convoys were blocked at Turanj.	Croatian Police	Disruption of troop rotation
63	15 July	Sector North Turanj Crossing	A Polish battalion convoy of 7 vehicles and 35 men was stopped.	Displaced persons	Disruption of unit rotation
64	15 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
65	15 July	Sector West 1730B Subocka (XL 667300)	A supply truck was stopped and three hours of negotiations were required before permission to pass was granted.	Croatian Police	Disruption of supply Harassment

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
66	16 July	French battalion 3 0739B Turanj	Three convoys were blocked at Turanj.	Croatian Militia	Disruption of troop leave rotation
67	16 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
68	17 July	Sector North Karlovac	A Polish battalion convoy of 30 soldiers and 20 vehicles was blocked from 15 July.	Croatian Police	Disruption of resupply Harassment
69	17 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
70	17 July	French battalion 3	No clearance could be obtained to cross at Turanj. Some 108 people were transported by helicopter from Pleso to Topusco.	Displaced persons	Disruption of troop rotation Diversion of air assets
71	18 July	Sector East Nustar (CR 3022)	UNMO team Vincovici was denied access to the road between Nustar and CP19.		Non-verification

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
72	18 July	Sector North	UNMOs reported that the road towards SZ was blocked at Brest Pokopski (WL 9834).	Displaced persons	
73	18 July	Sector South Otocac Crossing	Three Czech battalion buses were stopped at the crossing point.	Displaced persons	Disruption of troop rotation
74	18 July	Sector South Medak Crossing	There were no displaced persons at Medak Crossing, only two Croatian policemen. A Czech battalion convoy of three buses was denied access to Medak Crossing by Croatian Police and was forced to return to Zagreb.	Croatian Police	Harassment Disruption of unit rotation Morale
75	18 July	Sector South	UNMO team Gospic was restricted to the office (WK 281332) by 50-70 displaced persons from 181718B. UNMOs were allowed to leave the office on foot only. Four Croatian Police cars were observed in the area before the demonstration began.	Displaced persons	Harassment Non-verification
76	19 July	Sector North Turanj	The Croatian Police closed the supply line to the Polish battalion observation post 310. This observation post had food and fuel for only one day.	Displaced persons and Croatian Police	Disruption of supply Loss of freedom of movement

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Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
77	19 July	Sector South Medak	A Canadian logistics battalion resupply convoy was prevented from crossing the previous day. The convoy returned to Split.	Croatian Police	Disruption of supply
78	19 July	French battalion 3 0700B Turanj	No airlift was scheduled. Some 87 persons were left at Pleso to wait for an airlift scheduled for 20 July and 32 vehicles tried to cross at Turanj at 0700B but were blocked by police. The two convoys crossed at Miranje (NL 3311) on 20 July.	Croatian Police	Disruption of supplies and troop rotation
79	19 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
80	19 July	French logistics battalion Miranje	A food convoy for Sectors North and South and Bihac was refused entrance by a spontaneous civilian demonstration. UNMOs were unable to assist.	Displaced persons	Disruption of supply and diversion of log assets Damage to perishable goods

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
81	20 July	Sector East	All UNPROFOR and UNHCR traffic was blocked.	Displaced persons	Non-verification Disruption of supply Disruption of leave rotation Disruption of Belgian battalion unit rotation Disruption of humanitarian aid
82	20 July	French battalion 3 Ogulin-Senj Road	Two convoys were blocked on the Ogulin-Senj Road, then spent the night in the Zadar area. They tried to cross at Zemunik at 1125B. They were escorted to Jasenice by Croatian Police and were blocked there by displaced persons. The head of the demonstrators was the same as at Zemunik. The convoys spent the night in the area.	Displaced persons	Disruption of supplies Harassment Violation of the 29 March 1994 Cease-fire Agreement
83	20 July	French battalion 3 0900B Turanj	An engineering convoy was blocked and returned to Velika Kladusa.	Displaced persons	Loss of freedom of movement
84	20 July	French battalion 3 Miranje	A convoy was blocked by demonstrators and eventually turned back.	Displaced persons	Loss of freedom of movement
85	20 July	Sector South Czech battalion Medak	Three buses with 120 soldiers returning from leave were blocked by demonstrators and returned to Zagreb.	Displaced persons	Disruption of leave rotation

Serial No.	Date	Location	Who/what was restricted	Blocked by	Impact on ability to fulfil mandate
86	21 July	Sector South Jordanian battalion 3	Five buses with 270 soldiers were blocked at Gospic by demonstrators. The soldiers attempted to cross on foot but were stopped by an elderly female displaced person who threatened them with a shotgun. The Croatian Police were present and took no action. Clearance for this move had been received on 20 July from Croatian authorities.	Displaced persons and Croatian Police	Disruption of unit rotation Congestion at Pleso Morale Violation of the 29 March 1994 Cease-fire Agreement
87	21 July	French battalion 3 0400B Maselinica	Continued from serial No. 82. The convoys, now into their third day on the road, attempted to enter UNPA. It was stopped by a single Croatian policeman who refused to let them pass, despite efforts by UNMOs and Sector South headquarters. The convoys withdrew.	Croatian Police	Disruption of supply Violation of the 29 March 1994 Cease-fire Agreement
88	21 July	French logistics battalion Miranje	Food convoys for Sectors South and North were blocked by Croatian Police. Negotiations between UNMOs and police continued.	Croatian Police	Disruption of supply Loss of freedom of movement

Annex II

Unit rotation

Date	Number of persons	Remarks
11 July	95	Dutch battalion rotation to Srebenica rerouted through Hungary. Approximate one-day delay.
14 July	109	"
18 July	220	"
21	230	"
24	195	"
22 July	196	Jordanian battalion 3 rotation may be postponed owing to blockage of the crossing point
25	227	"
30	243	"
08 August	241	"
15 July	31	Polish battalion: 31 persons, 17 armoured personnel carriers, 13 trucks and 7 jeeps waiting for clearance at Karlovac to enter Sector North
18 July	60	Waiting to leave Sector North at end of tour
22 July	160	Polish battalion (reinforcement) will arrive at Pleso
12 July	45	Ukrainian battalion convoy waiting at Pleso since 12 July
10 August		Argentine battalion (Sector West) may experience problems
15 August		Danish battalion (Sector North) may experience problems

Annex III

Unit leave

Sector East

1. 9 persons from Sector East had their leave delayed owing to problems at the crossing point.

2. 62 persons returning from leave were delayed for four days at Pleso.

Sector North

1. 130 French battalion 2 soldiers returning from leave were waiting at Pleso since 12 July.

2. 245 Polish battalion soldiers returning from leave were waiting at Pleso since 17 July.

3. 45 Ukrainian battalion soldiers returning from leave were waiting at Pleso since 12 July.

4. 130 Polish battalion soldiers had their leave delayed owing to problems at the crossing point.

5. 25 Ukrainian battalion soldiers will arrive from leave in Pleso on 19 July.

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/889
28 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ANGOLA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the following letter from H.E. Mr. Venancio de Moura, Minister of External Relations of the Republic of Angola, with the request that it be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Afonso VAN-DUNEM "MBINDA"
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 27 July 1994 from the Minister of External Relations of Angola addressed to the President of the Security Council

In the expectation that there will be a meeting of the Security Council to discuss Angola, previously scheduled for the end of the month, I thought it appropriate to write to you on behalf of the people and Government of Angola. I want to address aspects that appear to me to be fundamental to the correct understanding of the prevailing situation in Angola by members of the Council over which you preside. This action is being taken because I have verified that the information on which discussion of the Angolan question is being based (S/1994/865) contains a lack of detail and is written from a perspective that appears to ignore that a legitimate Government exists in Angola. It was democratically elected, and no one, under any circumstances, can demand that it relinquish responsibilities recognized within the purview of any Government.

This verification, although not new, has recently taken several worrisome turns. The Angolan Government considers particularly serious, for example, the fact that at the level of the United Nations, through the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Angola, an incomprehensible parallel has been established between the Government and the rebel forces of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) - to say nothing of that between the aggrieved party and the aggressor.

We understand that the mediator role that the United Nations is undertaking in Lusaka in the process of searching for peace requires some balance in the efforts applied; but we have difficulty accepting that neutrality may be confused with partiality by not recognizing in an explicit and clear manner that the current Angolan conflict has a well-known cause and an identified responsible party - which is UNITA. This party should be treated always in accordance with the posture that brought it unanimous condemnation by the international community - reinforced with sanctions placed in effect by the Security Council in its resolution 864 (1993).

We must point out that distortions similar to those referred to above only satisfy UNITA's illegitimate aspirations and contribute to the prolonging of the war. This is because that organization continues to feel no real pressure to abandon its warlike objectives and arrogant behaviour at the Lusaka talks.

I would like to note that prior to arriving at this point in more or less productive talks, we undertook a long and arduous trek from Namibe (Angola), to Addis Ababa, and to Abidjan. The Government sought to bring an immediate end to the war, but there was no corresponding attitude on the part of UNITA. It merely took advantage of these events to deceive international public opinion and gain time to broaden and consolidate its military victories on the ground. It continued to seek to take power by force or the division of the country, a fact that happily was included in the report of the Secretary-General of 22 July 1994 (S/1994/865).

It is likewise important to emphasize that the participation of UNITA in the Lusaka negotiations did not happen so much because of its own volition as because of Security Council resolution 864 (1993) and other forms of pressure that did not leave it another alternative at the time.

In this regard, I am convinced that you will understand the importance of pressures on UNITA so that the negotiating process may reach a positive conclusion.

For this reason, the Angolan Government, which has the right to exercise plainly all inherent sovereign powers, will not permit UNITA's insurgency to continue indefinitely against established order and place the security of the country in danger, or against the lives of citizens and their possessions. Successive resolutions of the Security Council have reaffirmed this right of the Angolan Government.

In exercising this legitimate prerogative, one that cannot nor should not be questioned, the Government is trying to oblige UNITA to convince itself of the non-viability of its military strategy and of the necessity to assume in Lusaka a constructive position that safeguards the national unity and territorial integrity of the country and established democratic order.

We know that this is not the principle that UNITA is advocating, rather it is interested in maintaining indefinitely control of zones of the country that it occupied by force after the multiparty elections of September 1992. For this reason, it falsely manifests its support for a countrywide cease-fire outside a global agreement in Lusaka. It places this issue above all the problems that it invoked to justify the war; attempting to make unclear not only the negotiating process, but fundamentally the general situation in the country, where the Government, facing a status quo cease-fire would have great difficulty then avoiding a de facto division of the country.

It would be a terrible situation if such a division of Angola were to take place. From a domestic point of view, it would have more disastrous consequences than any other. Additionally, the consequences for southern Africa would be so serious that the Angolan Government and the United Nations must together try to coordinate a number of actions so that they do not inadvertently contribute to UNITA's game plan. This includes even those actions motivated by a concern over the humanitarian situation among the suffering populations in Angola.

I would like to point out that more than two thirds of the Angolan population live in areas under government control. A good part of these people fled from areas occupied by UNITA in search of security and assistance of all kinds.

The disruptions that have taken place in the transport of humanitarian aid are due singularly to the fact that UNITA, with the intention of using hunger as a political weapon, has conducted attacks against aircraft, vehicle convoys and other means utilized by humanitarian organizations based in Angola in the distribution of aid to areas under the control of the Government.

Unfortunately, the blame for these serious incidents provoked by UNITA is not ascribed to the known instigators in a clear manner in the report of the Secretary-General.

The Angolan Government defends the principle according to which humanitarian assistance should be taken to all Angolans independent of the location in which they find themselves. However, the Government cannot subordinate itself to restrictions imposed by UNITA when that organization says that Huambo and other areas it occupies are the only priorities.

Improvement of the humanitarian situation in Angola will be possible only with an end to war, and it only continues because negotiations in Lusaka have not yet reached a positive conclusion owing to the intransigence of UNITA. The flexibility demonstrated by the Government in accepting the suggestions of the mediators on broadening the participation of UNITA in all levels of the organs of State administration has not yet been reciprocated.

The Angolan Government is convinced that applying all types of pressure on UNITA will facilitate the search for a negotiated solution in Lusaka to the Angolan conflict.

The profound interest of the Angolan Government in re-establishing peace as quickly as possible compelled it to accept the diplomatic initiatives of the mediator and the observers that led to the involvement of President Mandela of South Africa, President Chiluba of Zambia and President Mobutu of Zaire in supporting the efforts of the mediation within the established negotiating framework.

The participation of these heads of State will be of benefit if they are capable of using their influence to bring Jonas Savimbi to cooperate with the mediation to accelerate the discussion and conclusion of the few points that remain on the Lusaka negotiating agenda.

Finally, the Angolan Government considers it strange that the report of the Secretary-General does not recommend the application of a second package of sanctions against UNITA. This action was established by the Security Council in resolution 932 (1994) should UNITA not respond in the affirmative by 31 July to the proposal of the mediation.

I request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Venancio DE MOURA
Minister of Foreign Relations

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/49/284
S/1994/890
28 July 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Item 145 of the provisional agenda*
MEASURES TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 27 July 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to request that you arrange for the note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of the Argentine Republic, a copy of which is attached (see annex), to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 145 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Emilio J. CARDENAS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/49/150.

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Annex

Letter dated 27 July 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina addressed to the Secretary-General

I should like to draw your attention, and that of the international community, to the grave act of terrorism recently perpetrated in Buenos Aires.

On Monday, 18 July, at 9.53 a.m. in this city, the headquarters of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Aid Association, a building which also housed the Delegation of Argentine Jewish Associations, suffered a terrorist attack. The attack, which was carried out by a high-powered explosive device, almost completely destroyed the seven-storey building and caused serious damage to the adjacent buildings, as well as strong repercussions throughout the neighbourhood.

Until now, no definitive information is available on the number of victims; however, 82 bodies have already been recovered, and it is estimated that the tragic total will amount to nearly 100 dead, more than 200 wounded and 10 missing persons.

This new manifestation of the scourge of international terrorism, which amounted to an attack against the entire Argentine people, was most energetically repudiated by the Argentine society and Government, which desire only peace for themselves and for the rest of the world.

The bodies which were attacked in this case are civilian associations. The Argentine-Israeli Mutual Aid Association offers community services such as, inter alia, medical and social services, a job exchange service and valuable archives. The Delegation of Argentine Jewish Associations is a federation which serves as an umbrella for Jewish organizations throughout the country, including cultural, religious and sports associations. This profile brings out even more graphically the degree of cruelty of the perpetrators of this act, who, by choosing this target in a central, densely populated area at a peak hour, were not unaware that they would affect a large number of civilians in their homes or workplaces.

As the investigation into this crime proceeds, my Government's certainty increases as to its origin and the responsibility of foreign terrorist organizations, and the possibility of the existence of ties between these organizations and foreign Governments is being examined. Nor can we discount the possibility that support may have been given by some marginal group residing in Argentina.

Events since that fateful day of 18 July have lent support to the assumption that the motive for the attack in Buenos Aires was to attempt to derail the peace process in the Middle East, whose advancement is irritating to extremists. Therefore, on behalf of my Government, I should like to reaffirm the strong Argentine determination to continue actively to support this peace process.

The Argentine Government strongly condemns this unjustifiable, savage attack and reiterates its firm commitment to use every means within its power to elucidate the events and find and punish the guilty parties.

In extending this blanket condemnation to all manifestations of terrorism, Argentina endorses the need to intensify international cooperation to prevent, combat and eliminate these acts, which affect the entire community of civilized States, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with international law. In this regard, I have especially in mind United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/122, of 20 December 1993, entitled "Human rights and terrorism", and the Declaration of Belem do Pará, recently adopted by the Organization of American States.

I should also like to underline that, in view of the above-mentioned events, my Government deems it necessary for the Security Council to study ways to react appropriately to international terrorism.

In light of the gravity of the events, I should like to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 145 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Guido DI TELLA
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Worship

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/49/285
S/1994/891
28 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 38 of the provisional agenda*
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 27 July 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the European Union I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a declaration by the European Union on the meeting between King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin on 25 July 1994 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 38 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gerhard HENZE

* A/49/150.

94-30738 (E) 280794 28/07/94

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ANNEX

[Original: English and French]

Statement on the meeting between His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin issued on behalf of the European Union by its Presidency

The European Union warmly welcomes the meeting of His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel in Washington on 25 July 1994.

This meeting, the prior talks between Jordanian and Israeli representatives which took place in the Middle East region itself, as well as the signing of the declaration in Washington, represent another important breakthrough in the peace process. The European Union pays tribute to the vision and courage of the Jordanian and Israeli leaders, which have made such direct talks and agreements possible.

The European Union expresses the hope that, on the basis of the declaration signed in Washington, further negotiations between the two sides on the solution of outstanding questions can be brought to a successful completion in the near future and thus lead to an agreement which would be of paramount importance for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/892
28 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a resolution on the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, adopted by the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia on 17 July 1994 (see annex).

I would be grateful for your kind assistance in distributing the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Resolution on the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, adopted on 17 July 1994 by the House of Representatives of the Parliament of Croatia, the Sabor, at an extraordinary session held on 16 and 17 July 1994

Confirming its conclusions of 5 December 1991, 14 February 1992, 27 March 1992 and 7 and 8 May 1992, together with a resolution dated 5 June 1992, all of them in support of the deployment of the United Nations Protection Force in Croatia, as well as all the subsequent conclusions with regard to the peace-keeping force,

Recollecting that the Republic of Croatia, indeed, granted approval for the arrival of the United Nations Protection Force, having good faith in its consistent application of United Nations Security Council resolutions and its protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia as guaranteed by a series of Security Council documents, and, in particular, resolutions 769 (1992), 820 (1993) and 871 (1993),

Stating that the United Nations Protection Force has accomplished hardly any of the goals entailed in its deployment in Croatia, that is, it has failed to disarm the local Serbs' paramilitary formations, to ensure the return of any refugees/displaced persons, to protect and secure Croatian state borders, and to create conditions for integrating territories under temporary occupation into the constitutional, legal and economic system of the Republic of Croatia,

Expressing concern over the fact that in the areas under the control of the United Nations Protection Force ethnic cleansing has not been halted, while the destruction of civilian facilities, cultural and religious monuments, and various forms of violence, particularly against the non-Serbian populations, have continued,

Stating that the ineffectiveness of the United Nations Protection Force has given rise, and justifiably so, to the embitterment of Croatian citizens, and, in particular, of 250,000 refugees and displaced persons who have, after a series of futile actions and petitions related to the termination of their refugee status, finally entered public protests, which is understandable,

Recalling that the prolonged status quo in the temporarily occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia plays into the hands of the aggressor, making efforts to separate the areas concerned from the Republic of Croatia by a coerced change of their demographic structure and by inserting those areas into the economic and telecommunications system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),

Emphasizing, in the first place, that the Republic of Croatia, as a Member State of the United Nations, is entitled under the Charter of the United Nations, to have its sovereignty and territorial integrity protected against aggression,

1. Demands that the so-called pink zones be put, effective immediately, under the control of the Croatian authorities, in compliance with United Nations Security Council resolution 762 (1992);

2. Demands that the United Nations Protection Force, within the shortest time-span and without delay, be deployed and that it take control, jointly with the Croatian border police and the respective customs offices, along the borders of United Nations Protected Areas and between those and Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, respectively, in compliance with United Nations Security Council resolution 769 (1992);

3. Demands that the reinstatement of the Croatian civil authorities and the organized return of refugees and displaced persons to the areas under the control of the United Nations Protection Force commence effective immediately;

4. Demands that traffic by rail and road be immediately re-established, that the Adriatic pipeline be opened, that technical preconditions be created for inserting the areas under the control of the United Nations Protection Force into the telecommunications, monetary and energy system of the Republic of Croatia;

5. Requires of the Government of the Republic of Croatia that negotiations concerning a possible extension of the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force in the Republic of Croatia be adjusted to the demands stated in paragraphs 1 to 4 above;

6. Demands of the Government of the Republic of Croatia that it carry out strict control, effective immediately, of the transport of goods and people from the areas under the control of the United Nations Protection Force;

7. Decides to follow the manner in which the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council are being implemented, as well as the process of the Croatian authorities' negotiations with the United Nations Protection Force with regard to a further stay of the latter in the Republic of Croatia, owing to the fact that the justification for its continued stay has been called into question because of its ineffectiveness in carrying out its mandate hitherto; furthermore, the House of Representatives of the Croatian Sabor is committed to resuming its debate on the matter at its session in September.

House of Representatives of the Sabor of the
Republic of Croatia

Nedjeljko MIHANOVIĆ
President
of the House of Representatives
of the Sabor

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/893
28 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN

1. In my report to the Security Council dated 16 June 1994 (S/1994/716), I informed the members of the Council about the situation in Tajikistan and the efforts of Mr. R. Piriz-Ballon, my Special Envoy for Tajikistan, and Mr. Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to establish the necessary conditions for the second round of inter-Tajik talks on national reconciliation, under United Nations auspices. The present report contains an account of subsequent developments.

I. TEHRAN ROUND OF INTER-TAJIK TALKS

2. The second round of inter-Tajik talks duly took place at Tehran from 18 to 28 June 1994 with the participation of observers from Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Uzbekistan, which participated as an observer in the first round of talks, held in Moscow in April 1994, did not send its representative to Tehran.

3. The delegation of the Tajik Government was led by Mr. S. Zukhurov, Minister of Labour and Employment. Mr. O. Latifi, Chairman of the Coordinating Committee of the Democratic Forces of Tajikistan in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), was acting head of the delegation of the opposition. Both delegations had proper credentials from the Council of Ministers of Tajikistan and the leadership of the Tajik opposition respectively, and both had plenipotentiary powers.

4. In conformity with the agenda for the inter-Tajik negotiations, adopted during the first round in Moscow (see S/1994/542), and the agreement reached during consultations carried out by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs with the leadership of the Government of Tajikistan at Dushanbe and by my Special Envoy with the leaders of the Tajik opposition at Tehran, in May of this year, the second round focused on one main objective: agreement on a cease-fire and the cessation of other hostile acts.

5. During 10 days of intensive negotiations, the two parties were able to work out a concept for a cease-fire and the cessation of other hostile acts. They also agreed on the need to create a mechanism to monitor the implementation of

the agreement on a cease-fire and the cessation of other hostile acts. The issue was discussed at length and, based on the views expressed, my Special Envoy submitted to the two sides a draft protocol on the monitoring mechanism. At the insistence of the opposition delegation, the two sides agreed on the temporary nature of the agreement on a cease-fire, although the delegation of the Government strongly advocated the idea of establishing a permanent cease-fire. However, the issue of when the agreement on a cease-fire should come into effect turned out to be the most difficult and controversial problem.

6. The delegation of the Tajik Government insisted that the agreement should come into effect immediately after its signature, and stated the Government's commitment to fulfil, during a three-month period, certain conditions stipulated by the opposition delegation. Those conditions included the release of persons detained, arrested and sentenced in connection with the political confrontation and the civil war (a list of 29 persons was provided by the opposition delegation); dismissal of criminal cases against some opposition personalities; and lifting the ban on the activities of opposition parties, movements and media.

7. Consideration was given first to the establishment of a cessation of hostilities up to 1 October 1994. Following the rejection of this proposal by the opposition, my Special Envoy suggested that an agreement be reached on a cessation of hostilities until the third round of inter-Tajik talks (which would mean for approximately one month) provided that the Government gave its commitment to accept the above-mentioned conditions. However, this proposal, as well as many other options to reach a cessation of hostilities immediately after signature of the agreement, were rejected by the opposition delegation.

8. The Government delegation, for its part, rejected an opposition proposal for the entry into force of the agreement simultaneously with implementation by the Government of the conditions presented by the opposition. The Government maintained this position even when the opposition agreed not to insist on the third condition (lifting of the ban on political parties, movements and mass media). These disagreements between the two delegations prevented them from signing the agreement on cessation of hostilities.

9. Despite the fact that the two sides were unable to reach an agreement, they agreed on a joint communiqué (see annex) in which they once more reaffirmed their commitment to political dialogue as the only means of achieving national reconciliation. In this regard, and based on the previously agreed principle of rotation of venue for the negotiations, the parties agreed to hold the next round of talks at Islamabad, and requested my Special Envoy to hold consultations to determine the date for it.

10. The representatives of the observer countries and of CSCE played an active role during this second round, encouraging the two sides to adopt more flexible and conciliatory positions.

II. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS

11. As I have reported to the Security Council in this and previous reports, much ground has been covered in the process for national reconciliation in Tajikistan. Through their participation in the first round of negotiations, in Moscow, the Government and the opposition forces, true to the profound wishes of the Tajik people and acting under the advice of friendly countries, endorsed the principle that a political dialogue was the only means of achieving a solution to the political conflict in Tajikistan. Notwithstanding its inconclusive results, the second round of negotiations at Tehran marked a step forward in the difficult process of the restoration of peace and normalcy in Tajikistan. It helped create a common understanding of the concept of, and conditions for, a cessation of hostilities and of the need for a number of important confidence-building measures.

12. However, I have noted, with regret, that subsequent political developments and in particular the results of the nineteenth session of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, held at Dushanbe on 20 and 21 July, revealed that the Government still lacked the political will either to implement, or seriously to contemplate implementation of, the necessary confidence-building measures. It was expected that such steps as the release of 29 political prisoners and the dismissal of criminal cases against some opposition personalities would have been discussed during the session of the Supreme Soviet. This, regrettably, was not the case and the issue of the inter-Tajik talks was not even raised on this important occasion. Instead, the Supreme Soviet endorsed a political plan providing for a referendum on a new constitution in September 1994 and simultaneous elections for the post of President. The implementation of this plan, which does not provide for the participation of the opposition and ignores the agreed agenda of the inter-Tajik talks, threatens to jeopardize the negotiations which have been taking place under the auspices of the United Nations.

13. These actions, added to the fact that the Government's delegation at the inter-Tajik talks did not include representatives of all important components of the current ruling factions, cast serious doubts as to the preparedness of the Government to fulfil its stated commitment to the inter-Tajik negotiations.

14. For its part, the opposition has continued its armed struggle through border infiltrations and acts of terrorism and sabotage inside the country. It has justified this course of action by citing the continuing lack of "seriousness and sincerity" on the Government side in the inter-Tajik negotiations.

15. This situation has led me to reconsider the wisdom, at this stage, of continuing preparations for the third round of negotiations at Islamabad. I have, therefore, decided to suspend the activities of my Special Envoy in that regard until the parties take new and substantive steps that will give unequivocal proof of their sincerity and their commitment to pursue the negotiations in the context of the agenda agreed to in Moscow and in line with the course of action outlined at Tehran.

16. In the meantime, given the danger of a renewed escalation of the conflict and its potential international repercussions, I shall continue my efforts

within the framework of preventive diplomacy. In keeping with that policy, my Special Envoy will maintain the necessary contacts with the parties and the Governments whose active cooperation has been instrumental in securing the progress so far achieved. Likewise, the small group of United Nations officials in Tajikistan will continue to implement its mandate and take concerted action with CSCE, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international organizations and agencies in Tajikistan.

Annex

[Original: Russian]

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND ROUND OF INTER-TAJIK TALKS ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

28 JUNE 1994

The second round of inter-Tajik talks on national reconciliation, under United Nations auspices, took place in Tehran from 18 to 28 June 1994 with the participation of observers from Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The delegation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan was led by Mr. S. Zukhurov, Minister of Labour and Employment. Mr. O. Latifi, Chairman of the Coordinating Committee of the Democratic Forces of Tajikistan in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, was acting head of the delegation of the Tajik opposition. During the talks, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Ambassador R. Piriz-Ballon acted as intermediary.

The talks were business-like and frank. The two parties demonstrated a sincere desire to resolve the questions on the agenda for the talks in a constructive spirit.

In accordance with the agenda for inter-Tajik talks that was adopted during the first round in Moscow from 5 to 14 April 1994 and the agreements reached in the course of consultations in Tehran between the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tajikistan, Ambassador R. Piriz-Ballon, and leaders of the Tajik opposition as well as the talks between the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. M. Goulding, and leaders of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan in Dushanbe in May 1994, agreement was reached on the need to focus attention during the second round of talks on achieving an agreement on a cease-fire and cessation of other hostile acts.

The participants in the talks, through the mediation of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, carried out extensive and fruitful work in order to solve one of the most complex problems relating to the settlement of the Tajik conflict. The parties worked out and agreed on the terms of the cease-fire and the cessation of other hostile acts, which include:

(a) Cessation by the parties of all military actions, including any infringement of the Tajik-Afghan frontier, offensive operations inside the country, the shelling of adjacent territory, the conduct of any military exercises, or the redeployment of regular or irregular military units in Tajikistan and Afghanistan which may lead to the breakdown of this agreement;

Note:

In this connection, the procedure for the stationing, redeployment and other types of activities of Russian troops and the Collective Peace-keeping Forces of the CIS countries in Tajikistan which are in

accordance with agreements on the role of those forces will be defined within the framework of the mechanism for implementing this agreement.

(b) Cessation by the parties of terrorist and subversive acts on the Tajik-Afghan frontier, inside the Republic and in other countries;

(c) Prevention by the parties of killings, hostage-taking, unlawful arrest and detention, and plundering of the civilian population and servicemen in the Republic and other countries;

(d) Prevention of the blockading of inhabited areas, industrial and military sites as well as any communication facilities;

(e) Halting of the use of any communication facilities or mass media in order to undermine the process of national reconciliation;

(f) Refraining from using religion and the religious feelings of believers or any ideology for hostile purposes.

The parties also reached agreement on the time-frame covered by the agreement (the period of talks up to 1 October 1994); and questions relating to the establishment of a comprehensive monitoring mechanism for the temporary cease-fire and cessation of other hostile acts were also considered.

At the same time, differences in the approach by the parties with regard to the procedure for the entry into force of the agreement arose during the talks. The delegation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan insisted on the need for a cease-fire and cessation of other hostile acts immediately after the signing of the agreement and undertook the obligation to fulfil the conditions put forward by the delegation of the opposition during the period of the cease-fire and cessation of other hostile acts. The delegation of the Tajik opposition in turn insisted on the need for the simultaneous entry into force of the agreement on the cease-fire and cessation of other hostile acts and fulfilment by the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan of the conditions put forward by it: at the same time as the release of persons that were detained, arrested or sentenced; dismissal of all criminal cases initiated in connection with political confrontation and the civil war; lifting of the ban on activities by political parties and movements; and resumption of activities by the mass media.

In spite of the good will and flexibility displayed by the two parties and certain reciprocal steps taken, they were unable to reach consensus on the agreement, the text of which was practically agreed.

Realizing their responsibility for the fate of the people of Tajikistan, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to political dialogue as the sole means of achieving national reconciliation. In that connection, on the basis of the earlier agreed principle of rotation of the venue for the talks, the parties agreed to hold the next round in Islamabad and request the Secretary-General's Special Envoy to hold consultations in order to determine the dates for the third round of talks.

The parties expressed their profound gratitude to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the hospitality, help and assistance that it provided in organizing and holding the second round of talks in Tehran.

The parties also expressed their appreciation to the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, Mr. R. Piriz-Ballon, as well as the representatives of the observer States and CSCE at the talks for their help and assistance in organizing and holding the inter-Tajik talks on national reconciliation.

(Signed) S. Zukhurov
Head of the delegation of the
Republic of Tajikistan

(Signed) O. Latifi
Acting Head of the delegation
of the Tajik Opposition

(Signed) R. Piriz-Ballon
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations